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1 
I 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) 35 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. Nature of the Case. 
Appellants ask this Court to vacate a binding arbitration decision. Afier considering the 
extremely narrow scope of review of an arbitrator's decision and finding no grounds to vacate the 
award, the District Court confirmed the arbitration award. (R. Vol. I, p. 2 16-1 8.) 
This dispute arises out of the failure of adoctor, Dr. Jeffrey Hartford to abstain from drinking 
alcohol, a condition on his license to practice medicine by the Idaho State Board of Medicine and 
a requirement for insurance coverage for Appellants' medical malpractice claim. (CE 7, p. 2-4.) ' 
The doctor's insurance policy contained a Special Endorsement excluding coverage if the doctor 
consumed alcohol. (Id.) Dr. Hartford admitted he violated the terms of the licensing conditions, 
thus admitted breaching the terms of his insurance policy, excluding coverage for Appellants' 
malpractice claim. (Id.) Appellant H. Ray Harrison received treatment from Dr. Hartford during the 
time frame when Dr. Hartford admitted he had been drinking. (Id.; R. Vol. I, p. 78.) Dr. Hartford is 
an alcoholic and admitted he relapsed in 2001 and drank weekly until 2004, when he checked into 
rehab. (CE 3, Ex. B, Ex. I ,  p. 20.) Appellant Julie ~arrison', who spoke with Dr. Hartford at the 
hospital testified Dr. Hartford smelled of alcohol on several occasions. (CE 3, Ex. B, Ex. 1, p. 18.) 
H. Ray Harrison contends he was injured as a result of Dr. Hartford's medical malpractice. 
'"CE" refers to the Certificate of Exhibits, R. Vol. I, p. 232. 
2 H. Ray and Julie Harrison will be referred to collectively as "the Hanisons." 
(R. Vol. I ,  p. 80.) The Harrisons filed a lawsuit against Dr. Hartford. (Id., p.6.) Respondent Certain 
Underwriters at Lloyds London subscribing to Policy No. 20056 issued to Jeffrey Hartford M.D. 
effective from June 1, 2004, to June 1, 2005, with a retroactive date of June 1, 2003, and NAS 
Insurance Services, Inc. ("Underwriters") initially defended the action, but notified Dr. Hartford they 
would no longer be defending or indemnifying the Harrisons' claim based on his violation of the 
Special Endorsement. (CE 6, Ex. A, Ex. B.) 
The Harrisons settled with the Dr. Hartford for a payment of $32,500, a stipulated judgment 
against Dr. Hartford for $1,000,000 and an assignment of the allegedly negligent doctor's rights 
against his insurer. (CE 3, Ex. A, Ex. I.) Because the doctor's insurance policy contained an 
arbitration clause, the matter proceeded to arbitration. (R. Vol. I, p. 3.) The arbitrator found Dr. 
Hartford violated the Special Endorsement by drinking, rendering coverage for the Harrisons' claims 
void. (R. Vol. I, p. 198.) The Harrisons were awarded nothing by the arbitrator. 
B. Course of Proceedin~s. 
Underwriters generally agrees with the Harrisons' course of proceedings but would add the 
following: 
The District Court's July 28,2009, Order was an appealable order pursuant to Idaho Code 
$7-918. (R. Vol. I, pp. 216-219.) The Judgment subsequently filed contained no additional factual 
or legal findings. (Id. at 220.) The Judgment was filed so Underwriters could seek an award of 
attorney fees. (Id.) The time for filing a Notice of Appeal of the Order confirming the arbitration 
award expired on September 8, 2008 I.A.R. 14(a). The Harrisons filed their Notice of Appeal on 
September 11,2009. (R. Vol. 1, p. 222.) Thus, their appeal should be jurisdictionally barred by the 
application of I.A.R. 14(a) & 17(e)(l)(B). 
C. Statement of Facts. 
On November 15,2003, Dr. Hartford treated H. Ray Harrison at St. Alphonsus Regional 
Medical Center for a severe sodium depletion brought on by Mr. Hamson's alcoholism. (R. Vol. I, 
p. 78; CE 3, Ex. A, Ex. C, p. 4) The Harrisons sued Dr. Hartford, alleging he breached the applicable 
standard of care by infbsing sodium back into Mr. Harrison's bloodstream too quickly. (CE 3, Ex. 
A, Ex. C, p. 4.) According to the Harrisons, that sudden increase in sodium led to temporary 
paralysis and long lasting neurological effects. (R. Vol. I, p. 78.) The Harrisons also alleged Dr. 
Hartford breached the standard of care due in part to his drinking alcohol. (CE 6, Ex. A, Ex. A, p. 
4-7.) 
Dr. Hartford has a long history of substance abuse which was fully disclosed, documented 
and discussed during the arbitration process. Dr. Hartford held a license to Practice Medicine and 
Surgery in Idaho beginning on September 2, 1987. (CE 3, Ex. B, Ex. A, p. 4.) Dr. Hartford has 
engaged in excessive personal use of alcohol and controlled substances. (Id. at p. 4-2 1 .) As a result, 
Dr. Hartford entered into a Stipulation and Order with the Board of Medicine in I995 in order to 
retain his medical license. (Id. at p. 7-8.) Dr. Hartford violated that Stipulation and Order by smoking 
marijuana and drinking alcohol, an Order of Temporary Suspension was entered. (Id. at p. 8-9.) Dr. 
Hartford then entered into an Amended Stipulation and Order in March of 1997. (Id. at p. 11.) In 
August 1998, Physician Recovery Network advised the Board of Medicine Dr. Hartford had twice 
tested positive for cannabinoids. (Id. at p. 12.) Based upon that, another Order of Temporary 
Suspension was entered by the Board. (Id.) A Second Amended Stipulation and Disciplinary Order 
was entered into between Dr. Hartford and the Board in January of 1999. ("Stipulation and Order") 
(CE 3, Ex. A, Ex. D, p. JH 19- 26.) The Stipulation and Order required Dr. Hartford to "abstain 
completely" from the use of alcohol. (Id. at p. JH 2 1 .) 
Underwriters provided medical malpractice insurance effective June 1,2003, to Dr. Hartford 
that contained the following relevant provisions: 
EXCLUSIONS 
. . .  
2. Defense Only -No Payment of Damages 
Underwriters will defend an Insured against a Claim otherwise covered by this Policy, which 
includes allegations of: 
. . .  
C. an occurrence while any Insured rendering direct patient treatment is under the 
influence of alcohol, narcotics or hallucinogenic agents, or which results from other 
substance abuse. 
(CE 3, Ex. A, Ex. D, p. JH 37.) 
ENDORSEMENT 
STIPULATED SETTLEMENT AND DISCIPLINARY ORDER 
In consideration of the premium charged the attached Stipulated Settlement and 
Disciplinary Order, dated January 29, 1999, is hereby made part of the policy. Any failure 
to adhere to the terms and conditions of the Order will be in violation of the policy and 
will render the coverage void. 
(Id. at pp. JH 18-26.) The Stipulated Settlement and Disciplinary Order attached to the policy 
required Dr. Hartford to completely abstain from the use of alcohol. (Id.) 
On April 28,2004, the Harrisons filed a lawsuit against Dr. Hartford, and numerous other 
providers, allegingnegligence. (R. Vol. 1, p. 79.) TheHarrisons moved to amend their claim to allege 
a claim for punitive damages based on the contention Dr. Hartford had been providing treatment to 
Mr. Harrison while intoxicated or under the influence of alcohol. (CE 6,  Ex. A, Ex. B.) The 
Harrisons, during the course of the litigation against Dr. Hartford, disclosed Mrs. Harrison would 
provide testimony, "regarding Dr. Hartford treating Ray [Harrison] while under the influence of 
. . ." (Id., Ex. A p. 3 (emphasis added).) The Harrisons also argued before the Idaho State 
Board of Medicine's Prelitigation Screening Panel, "Dr. Hartford smelled of alcohol on days he was 
treating [H. Ray Harrison], that this impairment was impliedly a cause of his inadequate monitoring 
of [H. Ray Harrison], and that St. Al's was negligent in hiring a physician with known alcohol 
problems." (CE 3, Ex. A., Ex. C, p. 6.). Appellants have conveniently changedtheir allegations now 
that they stand in the shoes of Dr. Hartford. 
Underwriters learned that Dr. Hartford had been drinking alcohol when he failed aurine test 
taken in December of 2003. (CE 6, Ex. B.) The urine test was requested after Mrs. Harrison 
complained to Saint Alphonsus that Dr. Hartford smelled of alcohol. (Id.) Dr. Hartford admitted he 
had been using alcohol and entered a treatment program. (Id.) Underwriters informed Dr. Hartford 
the Harrisons' claim was not covered due to his use of alcohol. (Id.) 
Dr. Hartford eventually settled with the Harrisons for the sum of thirty two thousand dollars 
($32,500.00) and an assignment of Dr. Hartford's potential claims against Underwriters. (CE 3, Ex. 
A,, Ex. I.) On August 25, 2006, the Harrisons, as Dr. Hartford's assignees, filed suit against 
Underwriters. (R. Vol. I, p. 6.) 
Underwriters moved to compel arbitration under the Idaho Uniform Arbitration Act ("IAA") 
based on the arbitration clause in the insurance policy. (R. Vol. I, p. 164.) The insurance policy 
mandated that "[ajny dispute. . . arising out of, in connection with or relating to this policy shall be 
submitted to binding arbitration." (CE 3, Ex. A, Ex. D, p. JH 37.) The motion was granted by the 
District Court on December 1, 2006. (R. Vol. I, pp. 3 & 167.) The parties agreed their arbitration 
would be governed by the IAA and the rules of the American Arbitration Association would be used 
to aid in resolving any procedural disputes. (CE 6, Ex. C.) On January 10, 2007, counsel for 
Underwriters sent a letter to counsel for the Harrisons that contained the following: 
We will proceed under the Idaho Arbitration Act and look to the American 
~rbitration ~ssociationrules for guidance should issues arise during theproceedings. 
If my understanding is incorrect as to our preliminary thoughts on arbitration, please 
let me know. 
(Id. emphasis added).) Plaintiffs did not object that the IAA would govern the dispute. The parties 
each moved for summary judgment under I.R.C.P. 56(c). (CE 8,7  8-9.) 
Appellant's counsel, Eric Rossman, alleged at some point after the Motion for Summary 
Judgment had been fully submitted to the arbitrator for a decision, Mr. Rossman engaged in an ex 
parte communication with the arbitrator about the case. (CE 4,9 10- 1 1 .)According to Rossman, the 
arbitrator stated he was concerned about Dr. Hartford and had a friendor employee who had been 
apatientof Dr. Hartford and knew of Dr. Hartford'spropensity for substance abuse and sub-standard 
care for patients. (Id.) There is no evidence when the arbitrator became concerned or learned of this 
information; although the reasonable inferences is that it came aRer the matter was fully submitted. 
The arbitrator never indicated the information concerning Dr. Hartford was a surprise to him. As a 
matter of fact, there was voluminous evidence presented duing the arbitration proving Dr. Hartford 
was an alcoholic, abused recreational drugs, had been to rehab on several occasions and admitted 
to relapsing during 2003 by consuming alcohol several times a week from 2001 through January 
2004. (CE 3, Ex. B, Ex. 1, pp. 1-18 (extensively detailing Dr. Hartford's abuse of alcohol and 
drugs).) Dr. Hartford admitted that following his divorce in 2001, he drank three times a week. (Id. 
at 20.) The Board of Medicine specifically found, "the fact that [Dr. Hartford] was drinking alcohol, 
in violation of his Stipulations and Board Orders, is not in dispute" and he had been "actively 
drinking at times during the fall and winter of 2003." (Id. at 19.) This information was presented to 
the arbitrator on April 16,2007, several months before the conversation between Mr. Rossman and 
the arbitrator in January 2008. (CE 3, Ex. B, p. 2.) Mr. Rossman did not tell Underwriters' counsel 
of this conversation or make any objection to the arbitrator continuing to arbitrate the dispute. 
On January 25,2008, the parties received the arbitrator's decision. (R. Vol. I, p. 199.) The 
arbitrator found the insurance policy did not provide coverage for the Harrisons' claim because Dr. 
Hartford drank alcohol in violation of the Stipulation and Order with the Board of Medicine and in 
violation of the insurance policy's Special Endorsement. ( I d .  at p. 198.) Thus, the arbitrator held 
Underwriters was relieved of any further legal obligation to defend or indemnify the Hanisons' 
claim. (Id.) 
11. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Respondents feel the issues on appeal can be more clearly and completely stated as follows: 
1. Is theAppellantsl appeal ofthe order confining thearbitration awardjurisdictionally barred 
because they failed to file the notice of appeal within 42 days of that appealable order? 
2. Did the District Court err in confirming the arbitration award? 
a. Did the District Court err in holding that the Hanisons agreed to proceed under the 
Idaho Uniform Arbitration Act? 
b. Did the District Court err in holding Appellants failed to establish the arbitrator 
engaged in misconduct sufficient to vacate the arbitration award? 
c. Did the District Court err in finding the Appellants failed to establish the arbitrator 
was biased? 
d. Does the record contain substantial evidence to support the District Court's finding 
the Appellants waivedtheir bias claims by waitinguntil aRer the arbitrators' decision 
to allege bias instead of objecting to the arbitrator when they had the opportunity to 
do so? 
e. Did the Appellants establish the arbitrator committed a manifest disregard of the law? 
3. Did the District Court abuse its discretion in awarding attorney fees to Underwriters? 
111. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
Underwriters requests that it be awarded attorney fees incurred in defending this appeal 
pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 41 and Idaho Code $8 9-714 and 12-121. Idaho Code 5 12-121 
provides authority for an award of attorney fees when this Court finds that the appeal was "brought, 
pursued, or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation." (Id.) Idaho Code $ 12-12 1 
provides a basis for an award of attorney fees to either the insured or the insurer. Slaathaug v. 
Allstate Ins. Co., 132 Idaho 705,711, 979 P.2d 107, 1 13 (1 999). A case is considered frivolously 
appealed "if the law is well settled and the Appellants have made no substantial showing that the 
District Court misapplied the law." Bowles v. Pro Indiviso, Inc., 132 Idaho 371,377,973 P.2d 142, 
148 (1999). The District Court correctly applied the law concerning the limited nature of review of 
an arbitrator's decision. Because the Harrisons ask this Court to second guess the arbitrator's and 
the District Court's factual and legal findings the Court should grant Underwriters' request for 
attorney fees. The narrow scope of review of an arbitration award is well settled. The Harrisons 
essentially argue the arbitrator made legal and factual errors, which are not reviewable. Thus, the 
Harrisons' appeal is frivolous. 
Idaho Code $ 7-914 (2004) This Court has held that because attorney fees in the district court 
and on appeal are awardable under $7-914, there was no need to determine the applicability of $4 12- 
120(3) or 12-1 21 to arbitration confirmation proceedings. Driver v. Syntheticlndus. Coup., 139 Idaho 
423,430,80 P.3d 1024,103 1 (2003). grants Courts the discretion to award attorney fees to "promote 
the public policy of encouraging early payment of valid arbitration awards and the discouragement 
of nonmeritorious protracted confirmation challenges." Driver v. Synthetic Indus., Inc., 139 Idaho 
423,430,80 P.3d 1024,1031 (2003). "Attorney fees on appeal are awardable [pursuant to $7-9141 
in the Court's discretion." Id. 
If Underwriters prevails on appeal it is entitled to an award of attorney fees. See Deelstra v. 
Hagler, 145 Idaho 922,924-25, 188 P.3d 864,866-67 (2008) (affirming district court's award of 
attorney fees for pre and post-arbitration proceedings to prevailing party). Additionally, the 
Harrisons challenge the arbitration award on grounds beyond the scope permitted by either the Idaho 
Uniform Arbitration Act or the Federal Arbitration Act as they essentially argue the arbitrator made 
legal and factual errors which are not recognized bases for vacating arbitration awards. Thus, 
attorney fees on appeal should be granted pursuant to I.C. 4 7-914. Driver, 139 Idaho at 430,80 P. 
3d 1024. 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. -. 
"When reviewing a district court's decision to vacate or modify an award of an arbitration 
panel this Court employs virtually the same standard of review as that of the district wurt when 
ruling on the petition." Moore v. Omnicare, 141 Idaho 809,814,118 P.3d 141, I46 (2005) (citing 
Bingham County Comm'n v. Interstate Elec. Corp., 105 Idaho 36,42,665 P.2d 1046,1052 (1983)). 
An arbitrator'srulings on questions of law and fact are binding, even where erroneous, unless 
one of the enumerated statutory grounds is present. Reece v. U.S. Bankcorp Piper Jaffray, Inc., 139 
Idaho 487,489,80 P.3d 1088,1091 (2003); Chicoine v. BignaN, 127 Idaho 225,227,899 P.2d 438, 
440 (1995); Hecla Mining Co. v. Bunker Hill Co., I01 Idaho 557,562,617 P.2d 861, 866 (1980). 
B. Analvsis 
1. A~aeuants' Aaoeal of the Confirmation of the Arbitration Award is 
Jurisdictionallv Barred Because Thev Failed to We a Timelv Notice of Aapeal 
The Harrisons have appealed from issues determined by a final and appealable Order entered 
on JuIy 28,2008. (R. Vol. I, p. 216.) TheNotice of Appeal was due 42 days later, on September 8, 
2008. I.A.R. 14(a). The Notice of Appeal was not filed until September 11,2008, three (3) days too 
late. (R. Vol. I, p. 222.) The appeal should be dismissed as untimely.' 
The Harrisons assert four issues on appeal. (R. Vol. 1, p. 223.) The Harrisons' designated 
issues on appeal were adjudicated solely in the Order entered on July 28,2008. (R. Vol. I, p. 223.) 
However, the Harrisons' appealed from the subsequent Judgment entered on August 11,2008. (Id. 
at 222-23.) The Judgment does not adjudicate the issues presented by the Harrisons on appeal, except 
for the award of attorney fees to Underwriters which was necessarily entered after the August 11, 
2008, Judgment. (Id. at 220 - 23.)The Judgment merely directed Underwriters to file amemorandum 
of costs and attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code $7-914. (Id. at 223.) 
'Underwriters previously moved to dismiss the appeal as untimely which was denied. 
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The District Court confirmed the arbitration award in the July 28, 2008, Order, not the 
August 11,2008 Judgment. (Compare R. Vol. I ,  pp. 216-2 19 with R. Vol. I ,  p. 220.) The Harrisons' 
appeal from the District Court's Order is untimely. Their appeal from the subsequent Judgment does 
not cure their untimeliness. Pursuant to I.A.R. 17(e)(l)(B) a final judgment does not include "final 
... orders ... entered prior to judgment ... appealed from" for which the time for appeal has expired. 
Following confirmation of an arbitration award, the purpose for entering a judgment is to 
allow a party to enforce the arbitration award. A judgment also permits parties to request costs and 
attorney fees. However, the judgment is not required for a party to appeal from an order or decree 
that confirms an arbitration award. See Scaggs v. Mutual ofEnumclaw Ins. Co., 141 Idaho 1 14,117, 
106 P.3d 440,443 (2005); see also Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Berg, 61 F.3d 101,104 (1st Cir. 1995) 
(discussing need to enter judgment to enforce confirmed arbitration award but holding no need to 
enter judgment to appeal confirmation order). 
This Court held when a district court entered a final appealable order entitled "Summary 
Judgment for Defendants" and subsequently entered a "Final Judgment" referring to the Summary 
Judgment for Defendants, the 42 day period within which to file an appeal from the grant of 
summary judgment began with the entry of the appealable instrument entitled "Summary Judgment 
for Defendants," not with the "Final Judgment." Large v. Mayes, 100 Idaho 450,452-53,600 P.2d 
126,128-29 (1 979) (dismissing appeal as untimely when party failed to file notice of appeal within 
42 days of entry of immediately appealable judgment). In Large, the district court granted partial 
summary judgment on April 12, 1978, and entered an appealable judgment on April 19, 1978. Id. 
The court subsequently entered an "Amendment to Summary Judgment for Defendants, as to 
attorney fees only" on May 3 1,1978. Id. at 452,600 P.2d at 128. On June 23,1978, the wurt entered 
a Final Judgment that mentioned the April 19, 1978, judgment. Id. This Court held the April 19, 
1978, Summary Judgment for Defendants was a final appealable judgment as defined in I.A.R. 
1 1 (a)(2) and the time for appeal commenced from that date, despite the fact another two "judgments" 
were subsequently entered. Id at 453,600 P.2d at 126. Consequently, the notice of appeal filed in 
Large on June 28,1978, was not timely pursuant to I.A.R. 14 because it had not been filed within 
42 days of the April 19, 1978, appealable judgment, which resolved the issues being appealed. 
In the instant case, the District Court entered an appealable final order on July 28,2008. (R., 
Vol. I, p. 216.) The District Court entered a subsequent Judgment on August 11, 2008, without 
incorporating or otherwise referencing the prior appealable order, and making no additional or 
alternate findings. (R., Vol. I, p. 230.) The August 1 I, 2008, Judgment only dealt with issues 
relevant to an award of costs and attorney fees and had no bearing on the confirmation of the 
arbitration award. (Id.) Like the appellant in Large, the Harrisons were required to file their appeal 
within 42 days of the appealable order that determined the issues they want to appeal. It makes no 
difference that a final judgment, which also happens to be an appealablejudgment as t o m i s s u e s ,  
was subsequently filed. In this case the Harrisons filed a Notice of Appeal within 42 days of the 
Judgment, but seek to appeal issues decided in an appealable order for which the time to appeal had 
expired, the July 28,2008, Order. The Harrisons' appeal should be dismissed pursuant to I.A.R. 14 
and I.A.R. 17(e)(l)(B). See Carr v. Carr, 116 Idaho 754, 757, 779 P.2d 429, 432 (Ct. App. 
1989)(holding failure to file appeal within time limits prescribed by I.A.R. 14 is jurisdictional) . 
Underwriters request the Court find the appeal of all issues except for the District Court's 
award of attorney fees be jurisdictionally barred. 
2. The District Court Prooerlv Confirmed the Arbitration Award 
Dr. Hartford's insurance policy with Underwriters contains two provisions dealing with the 
use of alcohol. The first is a defense only exception concerning allegations that an insured was, at 
the time the medical services were provided, under the influence of alcohol or drugs. Under this 
exception, an insured would receive a defense but no indemnity. The arbitrator did not base his 
decision on this exclusion, although he could have given Mrs. Harrison's allegations that Dr. 
Hartford was under the influence of alcohol while treating Mr. Harrison. 
The other provision was especially drafted for Dr. Hartford's policy due to his long history 
of substance abuse. That Special Endorsement required Dr. Hartford to comply with& terms of the 
Stipulation and Order. Failure to do so would "be in violation of the policy and will render the 
coveras void." (CE, Ex. 2, Ex. B, Ex. D, p. JH 18 (emphasis added).) The Stipulation and Order 
required Dr. Hartford to "abstain completely from the use of alcohol." (Id. at JH 21 .) 
The arbitrator determined that Dr. Hartford had violated the terms of the Stipulation and 
Order. The arbitrator relied, but only in part, on the findings of the Idaho Board of Medicine, which 
held that, "the fact that [Dr. Hartford] was drinking alcohol, in violation of his Stipulations and 
Board Orders, is not in disvute." (CE 2, Ex. B, Ex. A, p. 19 (emphasis added).) This finding was 
separate and apart from any finding that Dr. Hartford was intoxicated while he treated Mr. 
Harrison.(R. Vol. I, p. 198.) The fact that Dr. Hartford violated the Stipulation and Order was 
undisputed. The record contains numerous admissions by Dr. Hartford himself that he used alcohol 
in violation of the terms of the Stipulation and Order. (CE 3, Ex. B, Ex. A., p. 19-20.) The 
consumption of= alcohol at = time was a violation of the Stipulation and Order. The Harrisons 
concede that Dr. Hartford drank in violation of the Stipulation and Order. (See CE, Ex. 5, p. 15 
(admission by the Harrisons Dr. Hartford drank at least five times in 2003).) Although the Harrisons 
continue to rationalize the extent and timing of Dr. Hartford's drinking (especially when doing so 
would be advantageous to their claim against Underwriters), they have not disputed the fact Dr. 
Hartford violated the terms of the Stipulation and Order and therefore violated the insurance policy. 
Because the undisputed evidence clearly demonstrated Dr. Hartford violated the policy, the 
arbitrator was faced with the following pure legal issue: 
The basic and overall issue in this arbitration proceeding is what was the effect of 
violating the stipulated order, and was the failure to adhere to the terms and 
provisions of the stipulated order a violation of the policy and thereby rendering the 
policy void, or rendering a recision or cancellation of the entire policy. 
(R. Vol. I, p. 197-98.) The arbitrator, succinctly and without relying on any disputed facts, answered 
this legal issue as follows: 
. . . the use of alcohol was in violation of the Disciplinary Order, and violated the 
condition for coverage, and therefore excluded coverage for the Harrisons' claim. At 
the time of Dr. Hartford's violation of the order and stipulation, he violated the 
Special Endorsement and Underwriters was under no further obligation or duty to 
defend and because of the violation there was no duty to indemnify. 
(Id., p. 198 emphasis added).) 
Before the District Court and again before this Court, the Harrisons argued the arbitrator 
made factual determinations on issues that were in contention. 
The Harrisons apparently contend Dr. Hartford's violation of the Stipulated Order was 
somehow a disputed fact. (CE 5, p. 13.) It was not. The Harrisons argue there was no proof Dr. 
Hartford had been drinking inNovember 2003, whenhe (Appellants Brief, p. 
5.) Whether Dr. Hartford was drinking when he treated Mr. Harrison is irrelevant to the Special 
Endorsement which is violated by drinking alcohol at all, ever. Notably, Appellants acknowledged 
Hartford admitted to drinking in 2003. (Id. ("Dr. Hartford testified he & drank in 2003, did not 
drink at all in November of 2003, and, in fact, drank mavbe five times that vear.") (emphasis 
added).) This limited admission is sufficient to trigger the Special Endorsement and no further 
analysis is needed. Nevertheless, Dr. Hartford lied during the Board hearing, as demonstrated by his 
later admissions. (CE 3, Ex. B, Ex. A at p. 20 ("he admitted that, during all of his monitoring 
contacts with the Board, he never auit using alcohol .... By his own admission, Dr. Hartford- 
drinking rermlarly again when he divorced his second wife in 2001 .") (emphasis added).) 
The Harrisons attempt to confuse therecord by focusing on the issue ofwhether Dr. Hartford 
was actually under the influence of alcohol at the very moment he was treating Mr. Harrison. The 
Harrisons emphasized the Medical Board hearing officer held, "the record does not support a finding 
Dr. Hartford was actively using alcohol while caring for patient HRH." (App. Brief, p. 6.) But this 
is relevant only to the irrelevant defense only exclusion and has no bearing on the Special 
Endorsement. Moreover, the Harrisons excised an important part of the Proposed Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Proposed Order. The Harrisons conveniently failed to include the following 
within their quote of the hearing officer's proposed findings: 
The record reflects Respondents' care and treatment provided to HRH is subject of 
a pending pre-litigation screening panel proceeding. Respondent intends to 
vigorously defend himself in that proceeding as against any claim that he may have 
violated the community standard of care in treating HRH. Although Ms. Anderson's 
[now Mrs. Harrison's] testimony is worrisome [continuing after the Harrisons' 
ellipses] the record does not support a finding that Dr. Hartford was actively using 
alcohol while caring for patient HRH or that he was impaired in his care and 
treatment of the patient. 
(CE 3, Ex. B, Ex. A, p. 18-19.) The "worrisome" testimony from Ms. Anderson was her statement 
Dr. Hartford smelled of alcohol on three of the five occasions she met with him between November 
15 through 23,2003. (Id. at p. 18.) The Harrisons conveniently gloss over their prior accusations 
now that they stand in the shoes of the admitted alcoholic. 
Whether or not Dr. Hartford was actually drinking while treating H. Ray Harrison is 
irrelevant and immaterial to whether he violated the policy by using alcohol at any time and is only 
relevant to the defense only exclusion. The Harrisons cling to the position the arbitrator erroneously 
determined Dr. Hartford was providing medical care while under the influence. (App. Brief, p. 27- 
29.) First, that would be a factual finding which cannot be reviewed by this Court. Second, the 
Hamsons conveniently overlook the undisputed evidence that Dr. Hartford drank on a regular basis 
in 2003, violating the Stipulation and Order and rendering coverage void. So, the arbitrator's 
statements concerning the findings of the Idaho Board of Medicine were not legally dispositive facts. 
Whether or not Dr. Hartford was sober (and just smelled of alcohol) when treating Ray Harrison 
makes no difference. The arbitrator made his legal ruling based on the undisputed fact Dr. Hartford 
violated the Stipulation and Order. That factual finding cannot be reversed. 
The arbitrator was faced with a very simple case. An alcoholic doctor was offered medical 
malpractice insurance with a Special Endorsement stating coveraee would be void if the doctor 
drank any alcohol during the time the policy was in force. Dr. Hartford admitted he breached the 
endorsement by failing to abstain from alcohol. The arbitrator undisputedly held the legal 
consequence of that breach was to exclude coverage for the Harrisons' claim. The arbitrator's 
decision is both legally and procedurally supportable, was properly confirmed by the District Court, 
and is not subject to reversal on appeal. 
a. T v  
Idaho Uniform Arbitration Act. 
The Harrisons argue that the District Court should havereviewed the arbitration award under 
the FAA standards. (App. Brief, p. 10- 15.) The Harrisons contend the FAA applies because the 
matter being arbitrated involved interstate commerce. (Id., p. IS.) However, the Harrisons agreed 
that the matter would be decided pursuant to the IAA. The FAA was never discussed nor 
contemplated by the parties during the arbitration process. The first time the FAA became an issue 
was when the Hamsons learned that the FAA gave them an additional ground for vacating the award 
manifest disregard. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that there is an exception to the application of the 
mles of the FAA to transactions involving interstate commerce. In Moore v. Omnicare, the Court 
held that "where parties have expressly agreed that Idaho law will govern arbitration, the IAA, not 
the FAA, applies as the substantive law in arbitration." 141 Idaho at 814,118 P.3d at 147; see ako 
Sovak v. Chugai, 280 F.3d 1266,1269 (9th Cir. 2002) (presumption that the FAA, and not state law, 
supplies the rules for arbitration is overcome by indication from parties that state law applies). The 
Harrisons seek to abandon the IAA in favor of the FAA because the FAA offers an avenue for relief 
not available under IAA. Idaho, when considering whether to confirm an arbitration award under the 
IAA, does not recognize a "manifest disregard" standard of review of an arbitrator's decision. 
However, even if that standard did apply, the Harrisons failed to establish before the District Court 
and this Court they are entitled to relief under that standard. 
The parties agreed the dispute would be governed by the IAA, the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure, and to a limited extent, the rules ofthe American Arbitration Association. (CE 6, Ex. C.) 
The parties clearly intended the IAA would govern the arbitration and therefore any dispute 
following the arbitration decision. Idaho Code 57-901 states: "A written agreement to submit any 
existing controversy to arbitration a a provision in a written contract to submit to arbitration any 
controversy thereafter arising between the parties is valid, enforceable& irrevocable, save upon 
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." (emphasis added) The 
Harrisons and Underwriters agreed to proceed under the IAA, not the FAA and the Harrisons could 
not unilaterally revoke their agreement once it became advantageous to do so. 
The Harrisons' attorney avers that he never agreed to proceed under the IAA, either expressly 
or otherwise. (CE 8, 7 4) However, the Harrisons' attorney does not challenge the fact that he 
received a letter from Underwriters' counsel stating unless the Harrisons made an objection, the 
dispute would be governed by the IAA. (CE 6,  Ex. C) A&er receiving this letter, the Harrisons 
counsel had reason to believe silence on the subject would be taken as assent to proceeding under 
the IAA. The letter requested action by the Harrisons if they disagreed with the expressed intention 
to proceed under the IAA. (Id.) Underwriters' counsel clearly manifested silence would be 
understood as an acceptance of the agreement. The Harrisons remained silent. 
When a party has reason to know that its assent would be manifested by silence and fails to 
object, the terms of the agreement are deemed to be accepted . Eimco Div., Envirotech Gorp. v. 
United Pacific Ins. Co., 109 Idaho 762,764,710 P. 2d 672,674 (Ct. App. 1985). As inEimco, the 
Harrisons had reason to know that their agreement to proceed under the IAA would be manifested 
by silence and inaction. They were told as much by Underwriters. Like in Eimco, there was no 
evidence the Harrisons intended to reject the offer to proceed under the IAA. The Harrisons only 
objected to proceeding under the IAA after the arbitration decision was handed down and the 
Hanisons, faced with the narrow avenues for relief from an arbitration award, sought additional 
avenues to vacate the award. But, at that point the arbitration had already proceeded under the IAA. 
Regardless, as will be demonstrated below, the Harrisons can not prevail even under the FAA. 
b. Avoelfants have failed to establish anv mounds to vacate the arbitration 
award under the IAA or FAA. 
Arbitrators are the final judges of law and fact. Bingham County Comm'n. at 42,665 P.2d 
at 1052. A court is precluded from substituting its interpretation of the submitted contract for that 
of the arbitrator. Hecla Min. Co., 101 Idaho at 566,617 P.2d at 870 (1980). TheHecla court stated: 
"The courts are precluded from considering factual or legal issues which are by 
voluntary agreement made the subject of arbitration. Judicial intrusion is restricted 
to extraordinary situations indicating abuse of arbitral power or exercise of power 
beyond the jurisdiction of the arbitrator." 
Id., at 563,617 P.2d at 867 (citations omitted). The Hecla court further noted: 
"It is the arbitrator's construction which was bargained for; and so far as the 
arbitrator's decision concerns construction of the contract, the courts have no 
business overruling him because their interpretation of the contract is different from 
his." 
Id., at 562,617 P.2d at 866 (citation and quotation omitted). "Even though a reviewing court might 
consider some of the arbitrator's rulings on questions of law to be error, the arbitrator's decision is 
nevertheless binding on a court." Bingham County Comm 'n., 105 Idaho at 41 n.7,665 P.2d at 1051. 
While a court of law or one of the parties to the agreement might interpret the contract differently, 
such a variance in interpretation is not grounds for reversing the arbitrator's award. Western 
Const., Inc. v. Oregon-Southern Idaho, Etc., 101 Idaho 145, 148,609 P.2d 1136, 1139 (1980). The 
arbitrator's rulings on the law or findings of fact are essentially unassailable on appellate review. 
The Harrisons argue the arbitration award should be vacated because: (1) the arbitrator 
engaged in misconduct by not disclosing apotential bias; (2) the arbitrator exceeded his powers by 
making a factual finding during a summary judgment proceeding; and (3) the arbitrator manifestly 
disregarded the law. (App. Brief, p. 16 & 26.) The District Court held the Harrisons failed to 
sufficiently establish reasons for vacating the arbitration award. (R. Vol. I, p. 216 - 18.) 
(1) The Harrisons Presented No Evidence the Arbitrator Engaged in Any 
Misconduct and Have Failed to Demonstrate Evident Partiality on the 
Part of the Arbitrator 
The Harrisons argue that the arbitrator engaged in misconduct by not disclosing a potential 
bias. (App. Brief, p. 16.) The Harrisons confuse "misconduct" with evident partiality. The failure 
to disclose a conflict could be grounds for vacation under the evident partiality prong of the IAA or 
the FAA. However, the Harrisons have provided no evidence the arbitrator engaged in any 
misconduct. The Hanisons argue the District Court erred in holding the Harrisons waived any claim 
of misconduct. (App. Brief, p. 16.) The District Court did not consider whether the arbitrator 
engaged in any misconduct because the issue was not presented by the Harrisons (R. Vol. I, p. 216 - 
2 18) and can not be reviewed now since it would be an issue raised for the first time on appeal. The 
Appellant has the burden to overcome a presumption that the arbitration award is valid. Reece, 139 
Idaho at 492,80 P.3d at 1003 (citing Mutual Fire, Marine d; Ins. Co. v. NoradReinsurance Co. Ltd., 
868 F.2d 52,57 (3rd Cir. 1989).). Providing evidenceof misconduct does not satisfy this burden. 
The Harrisons base their attack upon the arbitrator's integrity on his alleged disclosure to 
their attorney that a friend or employee of the arbitrator knew about Dr. Hartford's drinking problem 
and sub-standard care of patients. (App. Brief, p. 17.) That disclosure does not establish partiality, 
evident or otherwise. The Harrisons have never provided any evidence the arbitrator had any 
potential bias towards the Harrisons and only argue the arbitrator was biased against Dr. Hartford. 
(App. Brief, p. 17) (arguing arbitrator "had an inherent bias against Dr. Hartford.").) Dr. Hartford 
was not a party to the arbitration nor this litigation. 
TheHarrisonshave theburdenofestablishing the existenceofany evident partiality. Because 
both arbitration acts contain language pertaining to "evident partiality," the Idaho Supreme Court 
has recognized that the IAA is substantially similar to the FAA on that issue. Reece, 139 Idaho at 
488, 80 P.3d at 1089. Therefore, the case law from federal circuits interpreting the contours of 
"evident partiality" standard are, although not binding, persuasive. Federal courts have identified two 
different types of evident partiality: actual bias and non-disclosure. Woods v. Saturn Distribution 
Corp., 78 F.3d 424,427 (9th Cir. 1996). 
The Harrisons have confused and merged the two types of evident partiality, but in the end 
have failed to establish either. First, the Harrisons have admitted the arbitrator voluntarily disclosed 
the information. But they have not established- the arbitrator had the discussion with the friend 
or employee. There is no evidence the arbitrator had this conversation before he was selected as an 
arbitrator. In fact, areasonable inference is that the arbitrator disclosed the conversation shortly after 
he had it. Thus, the Hanisons have not established any information was not properly disclosed 
during selection of the arbitrator. Second, the Hanisons have not established the arbitrator's 
knowledge of this information affected on the resolution of the matter. They have provided no 
evidence of any actual (evident) bias. Finally, the Hanisons waived these arguments by failing to 
object to the arbitrator continuing to work on the case before they received an adverse decision. 
(a) The Harrisons Have Not Demonstrated Evident Partialitv bv Non- 
Disclosure. 
The Hanisons seek to vacate the arbitration decision because the arbitrator- to their 
counsel, Eric Rossman, he had heard f?om a third party that Dr. Hartford had a drinking problem. 
So, the Harrisons admit there was a disclosure and therefore non-disclosure cannot be grounds for 
vacating the arbitration award. 
The Harrisons' argument this information should have been disclosed sooner is not supported 
by the record because the Hanisons have not established when the arbitrator learned this 
information. As the record stands, the arbitrator apparently disclosed it immediately upon receiving 
the information. There is no evidence demonstrating the arbitrator had this information during the 
selection process or at any other critical time. 
Regardless, the information wasn't extraneous, surprising, new or even outside the 
permissible record. Dr. Hartford's drinking and substance abuse was well documented within the 
arbitration. Dr. Hartford himself admitted he was drinking on a regular basis during the time period 
from his divorce in 2001 until at least December of 2003, when he again tested positive for alcohol 
in his system. The mere fact a third person allegedly told the arbitrator he or she knew Dr. Hartford 
had substance abuse problems is merely cumulative and could not reasonably create any partiality 
against Dr. Hartford and certainly doesn't create bias against the Harrisons. Additionally, only "non 
trivial" biases and conflicts warrant vacation of an arbitration award See New Regency Productions, 
Inc. v. Nippon Herald Films, Inc., 501 F .  3d 1 101,1110 ("vacatur is only appropriate if the conflict 
left undisclosed was real ... and not trivial.") (citations and internal quotations omitted). The fact the 
arbitrator heard something about Dr. Hartford's substance abuse from an extrajudicial source is 
trivial considering the voluminous evidence properly before the arbitrator demonstrating Dr. 
Hartford's extensive substance abuse problems. Because the alleged conversation was disclosed and 
the information could not reasonably createa bias or partiality, the Harrisons have failed to meet the 
heavy burden of establishing the arbitration award should be vacated. 
The Harrisons argue had they known the arbitrator knew Dr. Hartford was an alcoholic, the 
Harrisons would not have chosen him. The Harrisons' contention they would have asked the 
arbitrator to recuse himself because of this alleged biaq rings hollow in light of the Harrisons' 
counsel's proposal to use a replacement arbitrator in this matter and failure to object to the arbitrator 
when they had the chance: (CE 6, Ex. D.) 
4The chosen arbitrator became gravely ill and had to postpone his resolution of the matter. 
Plaintiffs then sought a replacement arbitrator. However, the arbitrator regained his health and a 
replacement was ultimately unnecessary. 
The Harrisons' suggested replacement was a partner to the attorney who represented Dr. 
Hartford in the underlying proceedings before the State Board of Medicine concerning Dr. Hartford's 
violations of the terms of his licensure (i.e. drinking and using abusive substances). (CE 3, Ex. B, 
Aff., Ex. A, (Proposed Findings of Fact) p. 1 .) Therecorddoes not demonstrate the Harrisons would 
have forced the arbitrator to recuse himself based on the fact he had vague, second hand knowledge 
Dr. Hartford had a "propensity for substance abuse." (CE 4,7 11 .) They suggested replacing him 
with a person who had actual prior knowledge of Dr. Hartford's extensive history of drug and 
alcohol abuse. In any event, the Harrisons had ample opportunity to object to the selected arbitrator 
after learning of the alleged bias and failed to do so, as will be more fully disclosed below. 
(b) The Harrisons Have Not Demonstrated the Arbitrator Was Actually 
w. 
Simply stated, the issue is whether or not the arbitrator displayed any (evident) bias, 
not whether there was a someg-1 for partiality. Schmik v. Zilveti, 20 F.3d 1043,1047 (9th Cir. 
1994) ("in an actual bias determination, the integrity of the arbitrators' decision is directly at issue. 
That a reasonable impression of partiality is present does mean the arbitration award was the 
product of impropriety.") (emphasis added). 
The Ninth Circuit requires a high standard for allegations of actual bias by an 
arbitrator under the FAA: "The appearance of impropriety, standing alone, is 
insufficient to establish evident partiality in actual bias cases, because a reasonable 
impression of partiality does not necessarily mean that the arbitration award was the 
product of impropriety." Woods v. Saturn Distribution Corp., 78 F.3d 424,427 (9th 
Cir.1996) (internal citations and quotations omitted). To establish an arbitrator's 
"actual bias," therefore, "the party alleging evident partiality ... must establish 
specific facts which indicate improper motives." Ibid. 
Carmack v. Chase Manhattan Bank (USA), 521 F.Supp.2d 1017, 1027 (N.D. Cal. 2007). The 
Narrisons have not shown the arbitrator was actuallv biased against them. The Harrisons' arguments 
the arbitrator had improper motives is baseless and wholly unsupported by the record. 
Although a judge (or arbitrator) could be biased by discovering extrajudicial facts, in order 
for such bias to be disqualifying the alleged bias, "must stem from an extrajudicial source & result 
in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the iudee learned from his varticivation 
i n . "  Desfosses v. Desfosses, 120 Idaho 27,29,813 P.2d 366,368 (Ct. App. 1991) (emphasis 
added) (citation and quotation omitted). The Idaho Court of Appeals held a mere conversation 
outside the judicial proceedings, is not in and of itself evidence of bias. Smith v. Smith, 124 Idaho 
43 1,436,860 P. 2d 634,639 (Ct. App. 1993). In Smith, Vernon Smith alleged the Magistrate should 
have recused himself from the case after he had a conversation with a non-party about the case. 124 
Idaho at 434-35,860 P.2d 634-36. The Magistrate denied therequest based on his determination that 
he could be impartial. The Court of Appeals, finding no evidence of any &J,& bias, affirmed the 
Magistrate's discretionary decision to deny the motion for recusal. (Id.) 
Here, the Narrisons allege the arbitrator was biased by information he learned outside the 
arbitration proceedings. (CE 5, p. 3.) But the information learned by the arbitrator was already 
contained within the record. The Hamisons themselves submitted the materials containing Dr. 
Hartford's admissions he had been drinking both prior to and after the time frame he was treating 
Mr. Harrison. (CE 3, Ex. B, Ex. A, p. 19-20.) The evidence the Harrisons submitted contained Mrs. 
Harrison's own testimony she encountered Dr. Hartford at the hospital while he was treating Mr. 
Harrison and Dr. Hartford smelled of alcohol. (Id.) 
The Harrisons' only apparent basis for actual bias against them is the adverse ruling. "A 
disqualifying prejudice cannot be deduced from adverse rulings by a judge, whether they are right 
or wrong." Desfosses, 120 Idaho at 30,813 P.2d at 369 (citation omitted). "[S]uspicion, surmise, 
speculation, rationalization, conjecture, innuendo, and statements ofmere conclusions ... may not be 
substituted for a statement of facts" establishing actual bias. Id. (citation omitted). The Harrisons' 
mere suspicion and speculation of bias by the arbitrator based on receiving an adverse ruling fails 
to establish any actual bias on the part of the arbitrator. 
(c) Th-. 
"Where a party to an arbitration has constructive knowledge of a potential conflict but fails 
to timely object" then the objection is waived Fidelity Federal Bank v. Durga Ma Coup., 386 F.3d 
1306, 1313 (9th Cir. 2004). By failing to timely object to the alleged appearance of partiality, the 
objection is waived. Id. at 13 1 1. The same is true for objections based on allegations of actual bias. 
See, e.g., Union No. 420 v. Kinney Air Conditioning Co., 756 F.2d 742,740 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding 
failure to object to arbitrators with known conflicts waived if not timely made); Kodiak Oil Field 
Haulers, Inc. v. Teamsters Union Local 959,611 F.2d 1286, 1290 (9th Cir. 1980) (same). 
Here, the arbitrator disclosed the information that the Harrisons' allege made him biased two 
to three before the Arbitration Decision (App. Brief, p. 19 ("The Arbitrator's decision was 
received on January 25, 2008, approximately two to three weeks after the disclosure.").) Despite 
having ample notice of the alleged bias, the Hanisons did not raise any objection until nearly three 
months after the Arbitration Decision. When an arbitrator "is challenged for evident partiality, the 
issue is deemed waived unIess the objecting party raised it to the arbitration panel." Delta Mine 
Holding Co, v. AFC Coal Properties, Inc., 280 F. 3d 81 5,821 (8th Cir. 2001). The reasons for such 
a rule are obvious. "An interpretation under which a party could wait until it lost and then 
successfully raise the objection of partiality should be avoided." Id. (citation omitted). 
Because their objection wasnot made prior to the arbitrator's decision, and the Harrisons had 
ample opporhmity to raise any objections, the District Court held the Hanisons waived their 
obligation. (TR, Vol. I, p. 216 - 218) The District Court's finding the Hanisons waived their bias 
argument was supported by substantial and competent evidence and should be affirmed. 
(2) The Arbitrator Did Not Exceed His Powers. 
The Hanisons argue that the arbitrator exceeded his powers by ignoring summary judgment 
rules and deciding factual issues on disputed evidence. (App. Brief, p. 22.) The Idaho Supreme Court 
has "construed the phrase exceeded his powers in 8 7-912(a)(3) to mean that the arbitrator 
considered an issue not submitted to him by the parties, or exceeded the bounds of the contract 
between theparties." Chicoine, 127 Idaho at 227,899 P.2d at 440 (citations andinternal quotations 
omitted). Exceeding one'spowers, in the arbitration context, does not mean making a legal or factual 
error. Absent express limitation by the parties, the resulting gant  of authority to an arbitrator is very 
broad. Hecla at 564,617 P.2d at 868. 
The contract clearly grants the arbitrator the power to resolve all claims, both legal and 
factual, between the parties. The arbitration clause reads that, "[ajny dispute between the Insured 
and Underwriters arising out of, in connection with or relating to this policy shall be submitted to 
arbitration. . ." (CE 4, Ex. D, p. JH 37 (emphasis added)). The Harrisons, as assignees of the 
contract, stand in the shoes of the assignor. Bldg. Concepts, Ltd. v. Pickering, 1 14 Idaho 640,644, 
759 P.2d 931,935 (1988). Consequently, the Harrisons were obligated to submit all issues of law 
and fact to binding arbitration. 
The Harrisons' contention the arbitrator exceeded his powers is devoid of merit because he 
did not consider not submitted to him. Deciding issues on disputed facts is at most a legal 
error and does not rise to the level of exceeding one's powers. In any event, as amply demonstrated 
above, there was no dispute over the dispositive fact Dr. Hartford drank in violation of the Idaho 
Board of Medicine's Stipulation and Order and therefore in violation of his insurance contract. So, 
the only issue the arbitrator really had to decide was the legal implications of Dr. Hartford's violation 
of the Special Endorsement. 
The Harrisons argue the arbitrator did not have the authority to determine factuaI matters 
when rendering a decision on the cross motions for summary judgment filed by the parties. (App. 
Brief, p. 22.) However, the arbitrator did follow the rules of summary judgment. Rule 56(c) provides 
"an adverse party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials of that party's pleadings, but . . . 
must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact." At arbitration, 
the Harrisons failed to establish a genuine issue of materid fact.' The issue, as properly framed by 
the arbitrator, was what was theeffect of Dr. Hartford's undisputed violation of the Stipulated Order, 
namely did the violation void coverage for the Harrisons' claim. There were no disputed material 
facts relating to this legal issue. Dr. Hartford admitted he drank aRer the Stipulated Order was in 
affect. The Stipulated Order required total abstinence from alcohol. All that remained was a pure 
legal question. Based on those undisputed facts, the arbitrator ruled the violation of the Stipulated 
Order had the legal effect of voiding coverage of the Harrisons' claims based on the terms of the 
policy. This legal ruling is not reviewable on appeal and does not rise to the level of exceeding the 
arbitrator's power since this was the precise legal issue submitted by both parties on summary 
judgment. 
The Harrisons repeatedly confuse the issue by arguing the Idaho State Board of Medicine 
never held Dr. Hartford had been using alcohol at the time he was treating Mr. Harrison. (App. Brief 
p. 22 - 25.) This straw man argument only concerns the defense-only exclusion which the arbitrator 
did not use as the basis for his decision. The only fact relevant to the arbitrator's decision was the 
f& Dr. Hartford drank in 2003 and triggered the Special Endorsement. The State Board&! find Dr. 
Hartford violated the Stipulated Disciplinary Order prohibiting him from imbibing in any alcohol 
'Deciding whether Dr. Hartford was under the influence when he was treating Mr. 
Harrison is not material to the Special Endorsement which requires only that Dr. Hartford 
consumed alcohol at any time. See below. 
whatsoever. (CE 3, Ex. B, Ex. A., p. 19.) The Hamsons never disputed Dr. Hartford admitted 
drinking three days a week from at least 2001 (when he and his wife divorced) until at least January 
2004 (when he admitted himself into a substance abuse program located in Hattiesburg, Mississippi 
for several months). (Id. at 19-20.) No one disputes Dr. Hartford tested positive for alcohol use in 
December 2003. (Id. at 19.) No one disputes the State Medical Board found Dr. Hartford "was 
actively drinking at times during the fall and winter of 2003" and "the fact that [Dr. Hartford] was 
drinking alcohol, in violation ofhis Stipulations and Board Orders, is not in dispute."(Id. (emphasis 
added).) Mrs. Harrison testified she smelled alcohol on Dr. Hartford's person three out of the five 
times she met with him in November of 2003 to discuss her husband's condition. (Id.) The Harrisons 
argue Mrs. Harrison testified it "wasn't like [Dr. Hartford] had just taken a drink, but like he had 
been drinking prior to, possibly the night before." (App. Brief, p. 25.) The record clearly 
demonstrates the arbitrator decided the cross motions for summary judgment on an undisputed fact 
that Dr. Hartford drank alcohol in violation of the Stipulated Order. 
Moreover, because the arbitrator was both the finder of fact and law, the Harrisons were not 
entitled to any reasonable inferences from undisputed facts. "When an action will be tried before the 
court without a jury, the judge is not constrained to draw inferences in favor of the party opposing 
a motion for summary judgment but rather the trial judge is free to amve at the most probable 
inferences to be drawn from uncontroverted evidentiary facts." Loomis v. City ofHailey, 1 19 Idaho 
434,437,807 P.2d 1272, 1275 (1991). 
The arbitrator's reasonable inferences from the undisputed facts after "a very complete and 
detailed examination of the entire record on several occasions" are not in violation of I.R.C.P. 56(c). 
(R. Vol. I, p. 197.) The Harrisons never disputed the fact Dr. Hartford had violated the terms of the 
Stipulated Order.6 The arbitrator was free to infer from the evidence that Dr. Hartford did in fact 
violate the terms of his policy. The arbitrator, viewing the facts in the most reasonable light rather 
than in the light most favorable to the Harrisons, concluded the evidence supported the finding Dr. 
Hartford had been drinking. The arbitrator did not exceed his powers, and his Arbitration Decision 
was properly confirmed. 
4. 
the Law. 
The Harrisons argue that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law. (App. Brief, p. 27.) 
However, this Court has held the manifest disregard standard is not recognized under the IAA. 
Moore at 81 9,118 P.3d at 151. Because the parties agreed the IAA would apply, the Harrisons have 
moved for relief under a legal theory not recognized by Idaho and any attempt to vacate the 
arbitrator's decision under the manifest disregard standard fails. 
To the extent this Court tinds the dispute is governed by the FAA and not the IAA or finds 
the manifest disregard standard applies, the Harrisons have failed to establish a manifest disregard 
of the law. The Harrisons try to disguise under a manifest disregard mbric their contention the 
61n fact, the Harrisons sought punitive damages in the related malpractice lawsuit based 
on the allegation that Dr. Hartford's alcoholism was a proximate cause of the medical 
malpractice. (CE 6, Ex. A, p. 4-7.) 
arbitrator made a legal error (which he did not) by making an unauthorized factual determination 
(which he did not). 
The manifest disregard exception requires "something beyond and different from a 
mete error in the law or failure on the part of the arbitrators to understand and apply 
the law." San Martine Comgania De ~aveg-acion, S.A. v. Saguenay Terminals ~ t d . ,  
293 F.2d 796,801 (9th Cir.1961). Accordingly, we may not reverse an arbitration 
award even in the face of an erroneous interpretation of the law. See A. G. Edwards 
v. McCollough, 967 F.2d 1401, 1403 (9th Cir.1992). 
Collins v. D.R. Norton, Inc., 505 F.3d 874,879-880 (9th Cir. 2007). "This non-statutory ground is 
not an excuse for the court to weigh the 'degree of error' of law, if any, and thereby thwart the rule 
of limited review. Rather, the arbitrator must have manifested an infidelity to his obligation to 
honestly interpret the contract within the context of the issues submitted to him. . . . " Hecla 
at 566, 61 7 P.2d at 870. (emphasis added) Plaintiffs are required to demonstrate the arbitrator did 
more than commit an "error or misunderstanding with respect to the law." Merrill Lynch, Pierce, 
Fenner & Smith v. Bobker, 808 F. 2d 930,933 (2nd Cir. 1986). The Second Circuit explained: 
Judicial inquiry under the "manifest disregard" standard is therefore extremely 
limited. The governing law alleged to have been ignored by the arbitrators must be 
well-defined, explicit, and clearly applicable. We are not at liberty to set aside an 
arbitration panel's award because of an arguable difference regarding the meaning or 
applicability of laws urged upon it. 
Id. Courts must "defer to such legal conclusions and interpretations even though the arbitrator has 
misinterpreted the law." George Day Constr. Co, v. Carpenters Local 354,722 F.2d 1471,1477 (9th 
Cir. 1984). When two plausible interpretations by an arbitrator exist, the arbitrator's choice ofone 
ought to be honored even if the reviewing court would have chosen the other. IAMLocal389 v. San 
Diego Marine Constr, Corp., 620 F.2d 736,738-39 (9th Cir. 1980). The Harrisonsmust demonstrate 
the arbitrator's legal holding was "completely irrational" and constituted an intentional disregard of 
the law. Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Cunard Line, Ltd., 943 F.2d 1056,1060 (9th Cir. 1991). 
The Harrisons allege the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law by: (1) ignoring summary 
judgment rules; (2) making a factual finding irreconcilable with the undisputed facts; (3) ignoring 
the taw concerninginterpretationof insurancecontracts; and (4) ignoring established lamncerning 
the effect of failing to tender back premiums after rescission of a policy. (App. Brief, p. 26.) 
a. The Arbitrator Did Not Manifestlv Disregard theRules of Summarv Judment Found 
in the Idaho Rules of Civil procedure." 
As discussed above, the arbitrator made a legal decision based on undisputed and admitted 
facts, which is permitted under the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, even on summary judgment. 
Even if the arbitrator made an error of law (which Underwriters dispute), that error does not rise to 
the level of a manifest disregard of the law. 
b. 
The Harrisons claim that the arbitration award is legally irreconcilable with the undisputed 
facts. (App. Brief, p. 27.) The arbitrator's decision Underwriters had no duty to indemnify or defend 
Dr. Hartford against the Harrisons' medical malpractice claims can be easily reconciled with the 
undisputed facts of the case. By violating the Stipulation and Order, Dr. Hartford triggered the 
7The fact the Harrisons argue that the federal standard of manifest disregard should be 
applied is undercut by the contention the law manifestly disregarded is Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 56(c). 
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application of the Special Endorsement contained in his policy, which in turn rendered "coverage 
void" for the Harrisons' claim as stated in the insurance contract. The Harrisons real problem with 
the arbitrator's decision is that the Harrisons disagree with the arbitrator's application of the Special 
Endorsement. The arbitrator's resolution of that legal question is a reviewable under the IAA (or 
the FAA). 
The Harrisons argue factual errors that rise to a manifest disregard of legally dispositive facts 
can be grounds for vacating awards under the FAA.' (App. Brief, p. 27-28.) A fact is legally 
dispositive if it forms the foundation for a legal ruling. The arbitrator's alleged erroneous factual 
finding (that the Board of Medicine found Dr. Hartford had been drinking while providing treatment 
to Mr. Harrison) is not a legally dispositive fact. That finding was dicta. That finding played no part 
in the basis for the arbitrator's ultimate holding. The fact Dr. Hartford violated the Stipulated Order 
by consuming alcohol after the Stipulated Order and he treated Mr. Harrison cannot be 
disputed and this finding was the basis for the arbitrator's decision. 
The Harrisons cherry pick the Board of Medicine hearing officers' Proposed Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Proposed Order and attempt to gloss over the fact Dr. Hartford 
admitted to violating the terms of the Stipulated Order. (See App. Brief, p. 29 ('There is simply no 
evidence in the record demonstrating that Dr. Hartford ever admitted to using alcohol while he was 
treating Mr. Harrison or that he was under the influence of alcohol while treating Mr. Harrison.") 
Respondents contend the IAA and not the FAA applies and only respond to the 
manifest disregard of fact arguments in the event the Court finds the FAA does indeed apply. 
- 3 6 -  
The Harrisons overlook the hearing officers' finding Dr. Hartford, when confronted with the results 
of a positive alcohol test from December 15, 2003, "first denied using alcohol. However, he later 
recanted his denial and admitted to John Southworth that he had been drinking again for some time." 
(CE 3, Ex. B, Ex. A, p. 19.) The hearing officer also noted there was no scientific evidence of Dr. 
Hartford's use of alcohol during the time he treated Mr. Harrison because there was no test taken 
during that time frame. (Id. (noting the complaint about Dr. Hartford's use of alcohol and smelling 
of alcohol made to St. Alphonsus by Julie Harrison (then Anderson) '%as received too late to obtain 
laboratory confirmation of Dr. Hartford's alcohol status.").) 
Dr. Hartford treated Mr. Harrison from November 15,2003, through November 22,2003, 
or, in the late fall, early winter of 2003. The hearing officer found it was undisputed Dr. Hartford was 
drinking in the fall and winter of2003. So, logically, the hearing officer determined Dr. Hartford was 
violating his Stipulation and Board orders during the time frame he treated Mr. Harrison (albeit the 
hearing officer could not conclusively find Dr. Hartford was under the influence of alcohol at the 
very moment he treated Mr. Harrison). 
Breaching the Stipulation and Order was a violation of the Special Endorsement of Dr. 
Hartford's medical malpractice policy. The fact no one witnessed Dr. Hartford drink a beer in the 
hospital break room before strolling out to treat Mr. Harrison does not change the fact Dr. Hartford 
breached the terms of the insurance policy. The only real question for the arbitrator was the legal 
impact of that breach. 
The arbitrator's legal holding, based on undisputed facts, did not rise to the level of manifest 
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disregard. It was manifestly correct. Even if this Court believes the decision was legally incorrect, 
that does not merit vacating the award. To warrant vacation, the arbitrator's decision must 
demonstrate an intentional infidelity to the law. The Harrisons fail to demonstrate or even argueany 
more than the potential the arbitrator made an unreviewable error of law. The arbitrator's decision 
was properly confirmed by the District Court. 
c. Arbitrator Did Not Manifestlv Disregard Idaho Law Concerning Internretation of 
Insurance Policv Lanma~e 
The Arbitrator found Dr. Hartford's violation of the Special Endorsement rendered coverage 
for the Harrisons' claims against Dr. Hartford void, but did not mean amount to a recession of the 
entire policy. (R. Vol. 1, p. 198.) The Hanisons argue the arbitrator should have determined whether 
the policy language contained in the Special Endorsement was "unambiguous as to whether violation 
rendered coverage void" but the arbitrator "made no such determination in his decision." (App. 
Brief, p. 33 (emphasis added).) The Harrisons mistakenly believe the arbitrator was required to 
provide a written explanation of the ultimate holding. Neither the IAA nor the FAA require an 
arbitrator to provide a detailed explanation concerning the conclusions of fact or law. It is clear, 
however, that the arbitrator found no ambiguity in the contract language. 
The IAA requires only that "[tlhe & be in writing and signed by the arbitrators joining 
in the award." I.C. 5 7-908(a). (emphasis added) The IAA does not require written findings of fact 
or conclusions of law. Hecla, 101 Idaho at 557, n.l, 617 P.2d at 861. The Idaho Court of Appeals 
has stated Idaho Courts, "prefer that decision-makers provide an explanation of the reasoning behind 
a decision, to the parties in conflict. However, in light of the statutorily limited review and the strong 
presumption of validity accorded any result, we cannot say that arbitrators are required as a matter 
of law to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law." Cady v. Allstate Ins. Co., 113 Idaho 667, 
671,747 P.2d 76,80 (Ct. App. 1987). 
Federal law concerning this subject is in tune with Idaho law. "[AJrbitrators are not required 
to state the reasons for their decisions .... The rule that arbitrators need not state their reasons 
presumes the arbitrators took a permissible route to the award where one exists." A.G. Edwards & 
Sons, Inc. v. McCollough, 967 F.2d 1401, 1403 (1 992) (citations omitted). 
The arbitrator impliedly found the Special Endorsement to be unambiguous in holding it 
rendered coverage void for the Harrisons' claims against Dr. Hartford. The arbitrator quoted the 
Special Endorsement in his decision and thus clearly considered the language of the insurance policy. 
(R. Vol. I., p. 196.) By determining the legal effect of the Special Endorsement, the arbitrator 
presumably found the language unambiguous. That finding is not reviewable by this Court. The 
Harrisons erroneously argue the determination of whether a contract is ambiguous is subject to de 
novo review. (App. Brief, p. 30.) That is not the case when this Court reviews arbitration decisions. 
An arbitrator's legal conclusions are not reviewable. Under both Idaho and federa1 law, this Court 
is bound to presume the arbitrator considered the legal issues even though there was no detailed 
explanation of the reasoning behind the decision. 
d. Arbitrator Did Not En in Finding No Premiums Needed to be Returned Because the 
Insurance Policv was Not Rescinded. 
Plaintiffs' contention that the arbitrator committed a manifest disregard of law by failing to 
properly distinguish Idaho case law concerning tendering premiwns after rescission of insurance 
contracts does not meet the stringent manifest disregard standard. (App. Brief, p. 33 - 35.) Notably, 
the arbitrator determined that the contract had been rescinded, therefore no premiums needed to 
be tendered. (R. Vol. 1, p. 198.) The arbitrator's legal conclusion the policy was not rescinded is not 
reviewable. The decision was not the product of an intentional disregard of the governing standards. 
Because the policy was not rescinded, the law concerning tendering back premiums is irrelevant. 
5. 
Proceedis  - Below 
Idaho Code $7-914 reads that "Costs of the application and of the proceedings subsequent 
thereto, and disbursements be awarded by the Court." (emphasis added). Idaho Code $7-914 
does not require courts to find arbitration challenges were frivolousness, ill-founded or non- 
meritorious to award attorney fees to the prevailing party. 8 7-914 contains no mention of any such 
standard. The Harrisons attempt to graft onto $ 7-914 a standard that does not appear in the statute 
or in the case law interpreting Idaho's Uniform Arbitration Act. (App. Brief, p. 38 (arguing attorney 
fees under $7-9 14 only available when challenge was ill-founded, non-meritorious or supports policy 
of discouraging protracted challenges and encourages early payment of award).) The standard for 
awarding attorney fees under $ 7-914 is decidedly not the same as the standards of either $ 12-121 
or $ 12-123. 
Courts need only exercise sound discretion when awardingattorney feespursuant to 9 7-914. 
On its face, this statute contemplates an award of disbursements, which has been interpreted by this 
Court to include attorney fees, incurred in seeking confirmation of an arbitration award, obtaining 
a judgment and all subsequent proceedings to enforce that judgment. Driver, 139 Idaho at 429,80 
P.3d at 1030. Courts have the discretionary power to award attorney fees and need only exercise 
reason in entering such an award. Id Because the Hanisons cannot demonstrate based on the record 
properly before this Court the District Court abused its discretion, the Court should affirm the award 
of attorney fees? 
The District Court found Underwriters prevailed. (Order Re: Attorney Fees, p. 2.) Thus, 
Underwriters was entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs for the confirmation proceedings. 
See, e.g., Deelstra v. Hagler, 145 Idaho 922,925, 188 P.3d 864, 867 (2008) (affirming award of 
I attorney fees to prevailing party during confirmation proceedings under $7-914). 
a. District Court's Attorney Fee Award Under 6 7-9 14 was not an Abuse of Discretion. 
The Idaho Uniform Arbitration Act provides the Act "shall be construed as to effectuate its 
general purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact it." Idaho Code $ 7-921. No 
otherjurisdiction that has adopted the Uniform Arbitration Act has held attorney fee awards are only 
proper when the confirming wurt finds the challenges to confirmation were frivolously or 
unreasonably brought or pursued. In Wachtel v. Shoney 's inc., 830 S.W.2d 905,909 (Tenn. App 
9Because the Harrisons failed to properly submit the transcript of the hearing on 
Underwriters' Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees, the Supreme Court denied the request 
to augment the record. All references to the hearing in App. Brief should be consequently 
disregarded. 
1991). In Driver, the Idaho Supreme Court cited Wachtel approvingly. 139 Idaho at 430,80 P.3d at 
103 I. the Tennessee Court of Appeals considered T.C.A. 5 29-5-3 15, which is identical to Idaho's 
5 7-91 4. The Wachtel Court also noted that Nevada's statutory provision entitling parties to attorney 
fee awards for bringing confirmation proceedings was identical. 830 S.W.2d at 909. The Wachtel 
Court held attorney fee awards following the confirmation of an arbitration award were within the 
discretion of the trial court and would not be disturbed absent a finding that the trial court abused 
its discretion. Id.  The Wachtel Court did not state the trial courts were required to find the 
challenging party acted frivolously or unreasonably. The holding of Wachtel comports with the 
Idaho Supreme Court's jurisprudence. See Driver, 139 Idaho at 430,80 P.3d at 1031 (holding that 
award of attorney fees under 7-914 was within courts' discretion). 
In County of Clark v. Blanchard Const. Co., 653 P.2d 12 17,1220 (Nev. 1982), the Nevada 
Supreme Court interpreted the identical provision of its Uniform Arbitration Act and held that "[tlhe 
award of attorney's fees resides within the discretionof the court." Id., at 653 P.2d 121 7, I220 (Nev. 
1982). TheNevada Supreme Court never discussed or considered whether or not the trial court found 
the actions of the party challenging confirmation were frivolous or unreasonable. Id. 
As in Wachtel and Blanchard Construction, the Idaho Supreme Court has never restricted 
attorney fee awards under Idaho's Uniform Arbitration Act to instances where the challenges were 
"ill-founded" or "nonmeritorious." The Harrisons' argument that 5 7-914 requires such a finding 
does not have any support in case law from Idaho or any other jurisdiction. 
b. Awarding Attornev Fees to Partv that Successfullv Confirms Arbitration Award 
promotes ~ a r l v  ~avment of Arbitration Awards and Discourages Challenges. 
The Harrisons argue that Underwriters wasnot owed any payment because thearbitrator held 
against the Appellants on every issue. (App. Brief, p. 39.) Thus, they argue that the award of attorney 
fees against them could not encourage the early payment of arbitration awards because nothing was 
owed. (Id.) The Harrisons miss the point. The awardof attorney fees against thenon-prevailing party 
in an arbitration challenge simultaneously encourages the early payment of arbitration awards and 
discourages challenges. Whether or not there is a payment due does not affect the public policy 
reasons behind awarding attorney fees. These awards discourage challenges to arbitration awards, 
whether by parties that do not want to pay the arbitration awards or by those parties that were not 
awarded anything by an arbitrator and felt the decision was wrong. The Harrisons fall into the latter 
category. The award of attorney fees against them does serve to promote the public policy to 
dissuade parties from seeking another bite at the apple once they lose before an arbitrator. 
c. Idaho Suvreme Court Has Held that 66 12-121 and 123 are not Avulicable to 
A-. 
The Harrisons essentially argue that the standards enumerated under $$ 12- 12 1 and 123 
should be grafted onto $7-914. But, the Idaho Supreme Court has never held that the standards of 
$5 12-121 and 123 apply to 5 7-914. In fact, when a party requested attorney fees as the prevailing 
party in an arbitration confirmation proceeding pursuant to $12- 12 1, the Idaho Supreme Court stated 
that "[ilt is however, necessary to decide the applicability of $5 12-120(3) and 12-1 21, because 
attorney fees are awardable through $7-914." Driver, 139 Idaho at 429,80 P.3d at 1030 (emphasis 
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added). 
The Harrisons merely asked the District Court to review the facts and law and find the 
arbitrator made mistakes. These are not reviewable. The Harrisons essentially argued, the arbitrator 
erred in finding that Dr. Hartford violated the terms of the Stipulated Order and that the arbitrator 
erred in determining the legal effect of that violation. The Hamsons tried to couch the alleged error 
as a manifest disregard, but failed to provide any evidence that the error, if any, rose above a mere 
factual or legal error, which would not be reviewable by the District Court or this Court. 
Undenvriters prevailed during the confirmation proceeding and was properly awarded its attorney 
fees and costs incurred in confirming the arbitration award. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The appeal should be denied. The arbitration decision was properly confirmed. The District 
Court's award of attorney fees to Underwriters was not an abuse of discretion. The Court should 
grant Underwriters' request for attorney fees on appeal. 
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